

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2094

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

ALL NATO CAPITALS 3363

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 4872

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: US OPENING STATEMENT

FROM US DEP REP MBFR

VIENNA FOR US MBFR DELEGATION

BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF US DRAFT OPENING STATEMENT AS IT WOULD READ IF ALL CHANGES RECOMMENDED IN REPORT OF OCTOBER 11 AD HOC GROUP MEETING (SEPTTEL) WERE ACCEPTED. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MY GOVERNMENT WARMLY WELCOMES THE BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. A GREAT CHALLENGE LIES BEFORE US. CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE FOCUS OF ONE OF THE GREATEST CONCENTRATIONS OF
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MILITARY POWER IN PEACETIME HISTORY. FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES, THE ARMED FORCES OF EAST AND WEST HAVE CONFRONTED EACH OTHER HERE. THIS CONFRONTATION HAS GIVEN RISE TO ABIDING APPREHENSION AND CONCERN. AND

IT REPRESENTS A FORMIDABLE BURDEN ON US ALL.

3. THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION. SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO SEEK TO REDUCE THE SCALE AND INTENSITY OF THE CONFRONTATION.

4. THIS IS SURELY ONE OF THE CENTRAL TASKS OF OUR TIME. IT IS ALSO A DELICATE ONE. THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE IS UNSATISFACTORY IN MANY WAYS, BUT WE WOULD NOT WISH IT TO WORSEN THROUGH UNWISE MEASURES. THUS, WE MUST CARRY OUT OUR TASK IN SUCH A WAY AS TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE, NOT WEAKEN IT. THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITY IN EUROPE IS A DELICATE ONE, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL WE WILL HAVE TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND STEP BY STEP, REALIZING THAT ALL PARTIES WILL WISH TO BE ASSURED OF THEIR SECURITY AT EACH STAGE.

5. WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS TASK TO BE EASY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS REPRESENT A RADICAL NEW DEPARTURE IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY. THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING QUITE LIKE THEM BEFORE. BOTH IN THE SUBJECT MATTER THEY WILL ADDRESS AND IN THEIR PATTERN OF PARTICIPATION, THEY BREAK NEW GROUND. BUT THEIR IMPORTANCE JUSTIFIES AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT ON THE PART OF US ALL.

6. MY GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS A PRACTICAL ONE. WE ARE INTERESTED IN CONCRETE RESULTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE NOT SETTING ANY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES FOR OURSELVES. WE CONSIDER THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MOVE AHEAD AT AN EVEN TEMPO, KEEPING PACE WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WITHOUT AN ARTIFICIAL PREORDAINED PATTERN OF BREAKS.

7. FURTHER, WE WILL STRIVE FOR A BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOS-

HERE. WE ARE HERE TO PERFORM SPECIFIC TASKS. WE ARE
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INTERESTED IN SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WE WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS TOGETHER. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN POLEMICAL DEBATES. THERE ARE, INDEED, MANY ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER WHICH WILL BE CONTROVERSIAL, AND WHERE VIEWPOINTS WILL DIVERGE. WHERE THIS IS THE CASE, EACH SIDE WILL WISH TO PRESENT ITS VIEWPOINT IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER AND SEEK TO PERSUADE THE OTHER SIDE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT IF ALL PARTICIPANTS MADE IT A RULE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT MATTER AND PRESENT THEIR POINTS OF VIEW IN TERMS OF CONCRETE, OBJECTIVE FACTS, AND NOT IN TERMS OF THE PRESUMED INTENTIONS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

8. THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH THEY CONTAIN UNIQUE FEATURES

AND WILL BREAK NEW GROUND, ARE NOT AN ISOLATED PHENOMENON. THEY DO NOT TAKE PLACE IN A VACUUM. MY GOVERNMENT VIEWS THEM AS TAKING PLACE WITHIN A CONTEXT WHICH INCLUDES A NUMBER OF RECENT FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS AND HOPEFUL PROSPECTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED IN THE SITUATION IN BERLIN WHICH WE HOPE WILL ELIMINATE THAT CITY AS THE SOURCE OF FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CSCE HAS BEGUN IN GENEVA AND WILL, WE HOPE, LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS. THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF HIGHLY IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTABLY THE SALT AGREEMENTS SIGNED LAST YEAR BETWEEN MY GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WHICH BEGIN TO LIMIT THE TWO POWERS' ARSENALS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SALT NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING ON A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING IT IN 1974, AS WELL AS ON THEIR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION. FINALLY, WE ARE WITNESSING INCREASINGLY NORMAL, INCREASINGLY PRODUCTIVE, BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST.

9. THE ENTERPRISE ON WHICH WE ARE NOW EMBARKING PROVIDES US WITH A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE TO MOVE FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION ON A PROBLEM AREA OF KEY IMPORTANCE FOR ALL OF US. THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE PRODUCT OF HISTORY. IT IS A RESULT OF PAST TENSIONS, AND AT THE SAME TIME A POTENTIAL CAUSE OF TENSION IN THE FUTURE. IN KEEPING WITH THE BUSINESS-LIKE AND OBJECTIVE SPIRIT WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED SHOULD GOVERN THE
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TONE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, WE DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE IN DEBATES OVER HOW OR WHY THE PRESENT SITUATION AROSE. WE SHOULD MOVE DIRECTLY TO THE TASK OF SEEKING TO CHANGE THAT SITUATION IN WAYS THAT WILL BENEFIT ALL OF US. THUS, WE HOPE TO REDUCE THE RISK ARISING FROM MISCALCULATION, MISUNDERSTANDING OR

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MISINTERPRETATION OF ACTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. OUR MAIN TASK WILL BE TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE OF LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS. IF WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS -- AND MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WE CAN -- THEN AN MBFR AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS WILL BE A HIGHLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE, SECURITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE AND TO IMPROVED, MORE FRUITFUL RELATIONS AMONG US ALL. SUCH A RESULT WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALL OUR PEOPLES. WITH THIS PROSPECT BEFORE US, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TEST THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS AND TO RESOLVE THE HARD, CONCRETE MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- AND THUS ARE A VALID TEST OF THE GENUINENESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE.

10. OUR NEGOTIATIONS WERE PRECEDED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN VIENNA BY PREPARATORY TALKS. IN THOSE TALKS, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES WERE AGREED AS GUIDANCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS:

-- MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

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-- THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AN UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED TO CONDUCT THEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND THOROUGH APPROACH TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WITH DUE REGARD TO ITS COMPLEXITY.

-- SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

-- ANY TOPIC RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER MAY BE INTRODUCED FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

11. WE BELIEVE THESE AGREED GUIDELINES FORM A SOUND BASIS FOR OUR WORK. THE PROPOSALS WE WILL MAKE DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND OUR APPROACH TO

THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THESE GUIDELINES.

12. IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, WE ALSO AGREED ON PROCEDURES FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE FEEL THAT NO FURTHER GENERAL DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURAL MATTERS IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME. OUR TASK IS NOW TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. WE BELIEVE THAT DAY-TO-DAY PROCEDURAL BUSINESS, SUCH AS THE SCHEDULING OF MEETINGS, CAN BE HANDLED IN APPROPRIATE WAYS.

13. THE PREPARATORY TALKS RECORDED AGREEMENT ON A FURTHER POINT: NAMELY, THE REGION ON WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOCUS. THAT AREA WAS DEFINED IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE AS CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. BASED ON THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WHICH I HAVE JUST ENUMERATED, I SHOULD LIKE NOW TO OUTLINE FOR YOU THE GENERAL APPROACH OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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15. IN OUR VIEW, THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE SIZE, CHARACTER, AND ACTIVITIES OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. WE AIM TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THOSE FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAD TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WHILE MAINTAINING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

17. WE AIM AT AFFECTING THE CHARACTER OF THESE MILITARY FORCES BY REDUCING THOSE ASPECTS OR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORCES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US BECAUSE OF THEIR INTRINSIC CAPABILITIES. AGREEMENTS ON TOPICS OF THIS KIND CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE.

18. FINALLY, WE AIM AT DEALING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE MILITARY FORCES IN A MANNER WHICH MINIMIZES THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION, SURPRISE, OR THEIR USE IN A DESTABILIZING MANNER. AGREEMENTS ON MEASURES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WOULD ALSO ENHANCE STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

19. WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE ONE WHICH PRESERVES UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY. NO PARTICIPANT OR GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM AN AGREEMENT. IT IS THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE AIMS I HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE WITH RESPECT TO THE SIZE, CHARACTER AND ACTIVITIES

OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE CAN AND SHOULD BE
REALIZED IN A MANNER THAT PRESERVES UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR
MY COUNTRY AND ALL ITS ALLIES ONLY WHEN APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT IS
TAKEN OF SIGNIFICANT, OBJECTIVE DISPARITIES AFFECTING THE CURRENT
SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DISPARITIES WHICH WE VIEW AS
OPERATING TO OUR DISADVANTAGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE DIS-
PARITIES IN MANPOWER, IN THE CHARACTER OF FORCES, AND
IN GEOGRAPHY.

20. LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE. IN MANPOWER, THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WARSAW PACT HAVE MORE GROUND PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY
IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN DOES NATO. WE CONSIDER THAT TO NARROW
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AND FINALLY ELIMINATE THIS DISPARITY IN MANPOWER THROUGH MUTUAL
REDUCTIONS WOULD IMPROVE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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21. WITH RESPECT TO CHARACTER OF FORCES, THE WARSAW PACT
FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF HEAVY ARMOR ATTACK
CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. I HAVE SAID THAT WE SHALL
SEEK TO AVOID DEBATES OVER EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS OR MOTIVES.
THEREFORE, I AM NOT REMARKING ON THE INTENTIONS OF ANYONE
WHEN I SAY THAT WE MUST REGARD THIS CONCENTRATION OF HEAVY
ARMOR IN THE HEART OF EUROPE AS A CAPABILITY POTENTIALLY
ENABLING ATTACK. IT IS AN OBJECTIVE FACT THAT A MARKED
IMBALANCE IN TANKS EXISTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

22. WE CONSIDER THAT STABILITY IS ENHANCED WHEN ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS ARE ABLE TO SEE EACH OTHER'S PURPOSE AS A DEFENSIVE ONE, AND WHEN THEY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER'S FORCES TO BE CONFIGURED IN A WAY CONSISTENT WITH DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE ARMORED CAPABILITY OF THE USSR IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE CONSISTENT WITH DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

23. THE THIRD MAJOR DISPARITY TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED -- GEOGRAPHY -- IS ALSO BASIC TO THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
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EUROPE. THE US AND USSR, WHICH STATION SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ARE LOCATED AT VASTLY UNEQUAL DISTANCES FROM THE AREA. THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY ADJOINS CENTRAL EUROPE. THE US, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS LOCATED AT A GREAT DISTANCE FROM CENTRAL EUROPE AND IS SEPARATED FROM THE AREA BY THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. THUS, ACCESS TO CENTRAL EUROPE IS FAR MORE DIFFICULT FOR US FORCES. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY HAS THIS CONSEQUENCE FOR MUTUAL REDUCTIONS: ANY SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RETURN QUICKLY AND EASILY; US FORCES WITHDRAWN TO THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE AN OCEAN AWAY. THIS POINT APPLIES EQUALLY TO REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY. A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS INHERENT INEQUITY IN A MANNER THAT DID NOT RESULT IN ANY DIMINUTION OF OUR SECURITY. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE.

24. IMPLICIT IN ALL THAT I HAVE SAID ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THESE MAJOR DISPARITIES IS THE CONCEPT THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST ACHIEVE EQUITABLE RESULTS, ARRIVED AT IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER. IN KEEPING WITH THIS CONCEPT AND WITH THE ACTUAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AT HAND, WE CONSIDER THAT AN ULTIMATE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITIES.

25. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL NOT OF THEMSELVES BE SUFFICIENT TO RESULT IN GREATER STABILITY. OTHER MEASURES WILL ALSO BE NEEDED. THESE SHOULD INCLUDE STABILIZING MEASURES, VERIFICATION MEASURES AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS.

26. NOT ONLY THE SIZE AND CHARACTER, BUT ALSO THE ACTIVITIES OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE MILITARY BALANCE THERE. THEREFORE, WE CONSIDER THAT CERTAIN ASSOCIATED MEASURES AFFECTING CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE NECESSARY. AS PARTICIPANTS WILL BE AWARE, THIS IS WHAT WE HAD IN MIND WHEN WE INTRODUCED THE TERM "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" INTO THE COMMUNIQUE OF LAST JUNE. ACTIVITIES OF

THESE FORCES, IF THEIR PURPOSE IS AMBIGUOUS, OR IF THEY ARE DONE
ON SUCH A SCALE OR IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO BE PERCEIVED BY OTHER
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PARTICIPANTS AS A POTENTIAL THREAT, COULD BE DESTABILIZING.
AGREED MEASURES RELATING TO SUCH FORCES ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGE-
MENTS DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION,
MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISINTERPRETATION -- THAT IS, WHAT
MAY BE TERMED STABILIZING MEASURES -- WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT
CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE AREA, AND COULD ENHANCE
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. WE SHALL HAVE A NUMBER OF SUCH MEASURES
TO PROPOSE.

27. IT IS ALSO OUR VIEW THAT APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS
CONCERNING VERIFICATION OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WILL NEED
TO BE AGREED. EACH PARTICIPANT OR GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS
WILL WISH TO HAVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE TERMS OF A
REDUCTION AGREEMENT ARE BEING FAITHFULLY CARRIED OUT. THAT
WILL CLEARLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL. IT WILL BE NECESSARY,
THEREFORE, TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREE-
MENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF REDUCTIONS.

28. WE CONSIDER THAT EACH PARTICIPANT WILL ALSO WISH TO
HAVE APPROPRIATE ASSURANCES THAT EACH PARTY TO POSSIBLE
AGREEMENTS WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD CIRCUMVENT
OR UNDERMINE AN AGREEMENT. WE WILL NEED TO TAKE THIS MATTER
UP IN DETAIL AT A LATER STAGE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN
THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE REDUCTION AGREEMENT MAY HAVE
BEGUN TO EMERGE.

29. WE BELIEVE, IN SUM, THAT APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS AND
ASSURANCES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF FORCES IN CENTRAL
EUROPE, REGARDING VERIFICATION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF A
REDUCTION AGREEMENT, AND REGARDING MEASURES TO ASSURE
THAT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED WILL
BE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH
PARTY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SAME PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY, WE WILL ALSO WISH TO ENSURE THAT
AGREED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE NOT RESULT IN REDUCED
STABILITY OR SECURITY OUTSIDE THE AREA.

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30. FINALLY, AS A LAST MAJOR POINT, I WISH TO REMIND YOU OF THE STATEMENT MADE AT THE MAY 14 PLENARY OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS BY AMBASSADOR QUARLES VAN UFFORD ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED BY MY COLLEAGUES. THAT STATEMENT SAID THAT "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, CANADA, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY IN THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE NATURE OF HUNGARY'S PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, DECISIONS, OR AGREED MEASURES OR TO THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY, AND THAT, IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS, OR MEASURES MUST BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED DURING THE PENDING NEGOTIATIONS."

31. IN CONDUCTING THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SIZE, CHARACTER AND ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A CONSTANT PROCESS OF ROUTINE AND LIMITED CHANGE AT WORK. EACH COUNTRY IS CONSTANTLY MAKING ADJUSTMENTS IN ITS FORCES AND THEIR ACTIVITIES:

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MEN ARE ROTATED, EQUIPMENT IS REPLACED, EXERCISES ARE SCHEDULED OR RESCHEDULED. WE ASSUME THAT THIS PROCESS IS NORMAL AND WILL CONTINUE. HOWEVER, SINCE WE WILL BE NEGOTIATING HERE OVER THE SIZE, CHARACTER, AND ACTIVITIES OF THESE FORCES, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY OF US TO IGNORE MAJOR CHANGES IN THESE FORCES WHILE THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS. ANY SUCH CHANGE WOULD IMMENSELY COMPLICATE OUR TASK HERE AND COULD CREATE A NEW SITUATION. WE WILL ASSUME, FOR THESE REASONS, THAT ALL PARTIES WILL THEREFORE EXERCISE SELF-RESTRAINT IN THIS REGARD.

32. I HAVE OUTLINED FOR YOU THE OVERALL AMERICAN APPROACH OF THE US AND ITS ALLIES TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. OUR GENERAL METHOD OF EXPOSITION OVER THE NEXT WEEKS AND MONTHS WILL BE TO PROCEED FROM THE GENERAL TO THE SPECIFIC.

THIS INITIAL EXPOSITION OF OUR APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER HAS DEALT WITH GENERAL CONCEPTS. WE WILL RETURN TO THESE CONCEPTS IN OUR ENSUING DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEXT DAYS. WE WILL ELABORATE ON THEM AND EXAMINE THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS WITH YOU IN INCREASING DETAIL.

33. WE WISH TO ENGAGE FROM THE OUTSET OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN SERIOUS, BUSINESS-LIKE EXCHANGES ON THE SUBSTANCE, WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT WITH YOU AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. FOR THIS REASON, WE WILL WELCOME YOUR REACTIONS AND YOUR VIEWS ON THE CONCEPTS I HAVE OUTLINED.

34. I WISH TO STRESS IN CLOSING THAT MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT WEIGHT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOAL WE SEEK -- A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY -- IS OF IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO US ALL. SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL WOULD SURELY BE REGARDED BY ALL OUR PEOPLES AS A GREAT AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO A LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS GOAL, IT IS UP TO ALL OF US HERE TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE IT. AS I STATED EARLIER, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TEST THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS AND TO RESOLVE THE HARD, CONCRETE MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- AND THUS ARE A VALID TEST OF THE GENUINENESS OF DETENTE IN
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EUROPE. WE, FOR OUR PART, ARE READY TO MOVE AHEAD.

35. ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE AUSTRIAN AUTHORITIES FOR AGREEING TO HOST OUR CONFERENCE IN VIENNA AND FOR MAKING AVAILABLE FACILITIES TO HELP US IN OUR WORK. THERE COULD BE NO BETTER SITE FOR THIS IMPORTANT CONFERENCE. END TEXT
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Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Comment: n/a
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